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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS
OF 1949-WAGE AND HOUR COVERAGE
WILLIAm S. TysoN*
Approximately 12,000 pages of transcript and appendices record the
extensive Congressional hearings which have been held during the past
four years on the various proposals to amend the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, more popularly known as the Wage and Hour Law. The
Act, however, remained substantially unchanged' until October 26,
1949, when President Truman approved H.R. 5856, the "Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949," which had been passed by the Con-
gress one week earlier. On January 25, 1950, the effective date of
the new amendments, many new concepts, relationships and obligations
will begin a life which will acquire meaning and stature through the
nurturing of the jurdicial process.
It is obviously much too early at this time to attempt to assess the
scope and full significance of the changes that have been incorporated
into the Act by these recent amendments. To do so would be analo-
gous to an attempt by a pediatrician to foretell definitely and completely
the adult traits of a new-born infant. We would greet with ridicule
such pomposity were it attempted, but, I venture to state, we would
react quite differently to an essayed analysis of the problems evoked
by the addition of another member to the existing family pattern.
Perhaps we would even go so far as to accord a respectful audience to
one who endeavored, with some knowledge of the infant's ancestry
and future environment, to suggest broadly the nature of the adult likely
to emerge.
In effecting several significant changes in the Act, the Congress
introduced a number of new concepts whose impact on certain areas
of the pattern which has evolved through more than a decade of litiga-
tion cannot now be fully or accurately measured or calculated. At
once it is quite clear, however, that much of the certainty which that
litigation had accorded to the scope and application of the Act in the
affected areas no longer exists. It appears equally clear that the Con-
* Solicitor, United States Department of Labor. The views expressed herein
represent the personal opinion of the author and are not necessarily the official
views of the United States Department of Labor or of the Wage and Hour
Division.
' The amendments effected by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (61 STAT. 84,
29 U.S.C., Supp. II, 251) and the "overtime-on-overtime" amendments (63 STAT.
44) were directed toward alleviating the impact of the Act in specific and unusual
situations rather than toward effecting any substantial change in its scope.
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gress did not intend by these amendments to revise or eliminate com-
pletely the legal pattern which had been created.
In my opinion, the problem before us is thus not so much one of
attempting to speculate upon the ultimate conclusions which the courts
may eventually reach, but one of ascertaining as definitively as possible
the areas which appear to remain untouched by the amendatory lan-
guage and of clarifying the issues in those areas which appear to have
been substantially altered. Obviously we cannot seek answers until we
ascertain what are the questions for which answers should be sought.
For reasons of time and space rather than of interest or significance,
this article is limited to an examination of that aspect of the Act, as
amended, which involves the scope of its wage and hour coverage.
2
I
The Fair Labor Standards Act simply fixes a floor below which
wages may not be forced by employer-employee bargaining or by the
fluctuations of our economy. It provides that employees within its
scope must be paid a minimum wage of 75 cents an hour.8 It provides
further that when employees entitled to its benefits work in excess of
40 hours a week, they shall receive for each hour in excess of 40 at
least time and one-half their regular rate of pay. The "prime purpose
of the legislation," as Justice Reed pointed out in Brooklyn Savings
Bank v. O'Neil,3 ' "was to aid the unprotected, unorganized, and lowest
paid of the nation's working population; that is, those employees who
lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum
subsistence wage."
To effectuate this "prime purpose," the Act was made applicable
generally to employees in interstate commerce, or in the production
of goods for interstate commerce.4 Though "the scope of the Act
[has never been] coextensive with the limits of the power of Congress
over commerce," 5 it has nevertheless been held applicable to "an infinite
2 It should be noted, however, that in addition to revision of the Act's wage-
hour coverage, the amendments also broadened its child labor coverage so as to
prohibit the employment of children in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce.
'Effective January 25, 1950. As this article is being written the minimum
wage required to be paid under the law is 40 cents an hour.
'324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
The pertinent provisions of the Act read as follows:
Sec. 6(a). Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following
rates-
Sec. 7(a). Except as otherwise provided ... ,no employer shall employ any
of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce for a workweek longer than forty hours, unless such employee receives
... not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942).
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variety of complicated industrial situations,"6 as Justice Frankfurter
noted in the Kirschbaum case. To a great extent this sweep of the Act
is directly traceable to the definition of "produced" (sec. 3(j)) which,
prior to the recent amendments, was defined to include processes or
occupations "necessary" to the production of goods for commerce.
In interpreting the statute, particularly in deciding cases involving
coverage under the so-called "necessary" clause, the Supreme Court
has pointed out that there is no "abstract formula," no "dependable
touchstone by which to determine whether employees are 'engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.' "r The prob-
lem has been, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "one of drawing lines,"
but "not at all a problem in mensuration. There are no fixed points,
though lines are to be drawn. The real question is how the lines are
to be dlrawn-what are the relevant considerations in placing the line
here rather than there."
s
Bearing in mind these general considerations, the Supreme Court
has held to be entitled to the benefits of the Act employees of a company
which repairs motors for customers who are producing goods for inter-
state commerce, 9 members of a drilling crew digging wells to produce
oil,1O maintenance employees in buildings used for the production of
goods for commerce,"1 employees of a local window-cleaning company
whose customers are engaged in commerce or the production of goods
for commerce,' 2 fireguards employed by a manufacturer of goods for
interstate commerce,' 3 maintenance employees in a building owned by
an interstate producer and predominantly occupied for its offices,14 and
the night watchman in a plant producing goods for interstate com-
merce.1
These decisions illustrate the scope of the Act's wage-hour coverage
under the so-called "necessary" clause at the time of enactment of the
recent amendments. It should be borne in mind, however, that many
additional decisions interpreted the area of coverage embracing those
engaged in commerce and those engaged directly in producing goods
for commerce, that is, "producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,
transporting, or in any other manner working on... goods" for com-
merce. But except for the minor revision of "in commerce" coverage
6 Ibid. 7 Id. at p. 520.8I d. at p. 523.
' Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
10 Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942).
" Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) ; Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,
328 U.S. 108 (1946)." Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946).
"Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944) ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
1 Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
" Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944).
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noted hereinafter, it is solely in the area of the so-called "necessary"
clause that significant revision of the Act's coverage was effected.1 0
As indicated above, coverage under the minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours provisions of the Act (secs. 6 and 7), is predicated upon
being engaged either in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce. The recent amendments effected no change in this respect,
but the terms "commerce" and "produced" were redefined in such a
manner as to effect changes in the scope of such coverage. 17 As re-
defined, these terms read as follows:
Sec. 3 . . .
(b) "Commerce" means trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States or be-
t7ween any State and any place outside thereof.
(j) "Produced" means produced, manufactured, mined, han-
dled, or in any other manner worked on in any State; and for the
purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been
engaged in the production of goods if such employee was em-
ployed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transport-
ing, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any
closely related process or occupation directly essential to the pro-
duction thereof, in any State.
The redefinition of "commerce" did not effect a significant revision.
As originally defined in section 3(b) of the Act, "commerce" covered
outgoing foreign commerce "from any State to any place outside thereof"
and interstate commerce "among the several States." It did not cover
incoming foreign commerce. As a consequence, inequalities arose under
the Act between employees engaged in foreign commerce based on
whether the flow of such commerce was out of a State rather than into
it. The amendment was intended to correct this situation. As it now
reads, the definition covers foreign commerce "between any State and
any place outside thereof." As a result, employees of importers are
" As pointed out in the statement of a majority of the Senate conferees, "The
change in the language of section 3(j) relates only to those employees . . . whose
coverage under the act has depended in the past on whether their work was "nec-
essary" to the production of goods for ... commerce." 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct.
19, 1949.
"'As originally set forth in section 3(b) of the Act, "commerce" was defined to
include commerce, "from any State to any place outside thereof." The House bill
amended the definition by substituting the word "between" for the word "from"
and the word "and" for the word "to." The Senate amendment did not contain
any amendatory provision and the conference agreement adopted the House version.
As passed by the House, the definition of "produced" in section 3(j) was
amended by inserting the words "closely related" before the words "process or
occupation" and substituting the word "indispensable" for the word "necessary"
which appeared immediately after the words "process or occupation." The Senate
amendment left the definition of "produced," as contained in the original Act,
unchanged. In conference, it was agreed to follow the House bill except that the
words "directly essential" were substituted for the word "indispensable."
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granted the same protection under the commerce definition as employees
of exporters.' 8
Otherwise the scope of the "commerce" coverage of the Act remains
unchanged. As before, any employee is engaged in interstate commerce
if he participates in the interstate movement of goods or facilitates or
contributes to such movement. Thus, employees in the telephone, tele-
graph, radio, and transportation industries normally are engaged in
interstate commerce since these industries function as actual instru-
mentalities and channels of interstate commerce.' 9 Also, employees
engaged in the maintenance, repair or reconstruction of instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce continue to be entitled to the benefits of
the Act because their activities facilitate and contribute to the interstate
movement carried on by the instrumentality.2 0 And, as prior to the
recent amendments, employees who purchase, order, or receive goods
or materials from other states are engaged in interstate commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
21
Thus, except for the expansion noted above, the area of "in com-
merce" coverage remains virtually unchanged. Equally untouched is
the "production" area which envelops those employed in the the specific
activities which may be described as actual production activities---"pro-
ducing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other
manner working on . . . goods." Serious questions concerning the
Act's application to these activities have not been extensively raised.
Where there are decisions, such as Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Lenroot,21 ' analyzing the extent to which handling constitutes produc-
tion, they will undoubtedly remain undisturbed, since the amendments
did not effect any change in this first part of the definition of "pro-
duced." 22
It is in interpreting the second part of the definition of "produced,"
covering any employee employed in "any closely related process or
occupation directly essential to the production [of goods]," that diffi-
culty is encountered in ascertaining the nature and extent of the re-
"8 See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 13-14.
"0 Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); Williams v. Jacksonville
Terminal, 315 U.S. 386 (1942); McComb v. Western Union Tel. Co., 165 F. 2d
65 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 862 (1948) ; Schmidt v. Peoples Tele-
phone Union of Maryville, Mo., 138 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1943).
-o Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (9th Cir. 1946);
Pederson v. Fitzgerald, 324 U.S. 720 (1945) ; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.,
318 U.S. 125 (1943); Walling v. McCrady Const. Co., 156 F. 2d 932 (3rd Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946).
2 Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) ; Cudahy Packing
Co. of Ala. v. Bazanos, 15 So. 2d 720 (S. Ct. Ala. 1943) ; Mid-Continent Corp. v.
Keen, 157 F. 2d 310 (8th Cir. 1946).2" 323 U.S. 490 (1945).
2 See Statement of a majority of the Senate conferees on the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949, 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949.
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vision of the scope of the statute. The Supreme Court has made clear
in the Kirschbaum and other cases that the courts had to determine the
meaning of "necessary to production" on an ad hoc basis. Undoubtedly
the courts will continue to use this interpretative process, and con-
ceivably the change in terminology could result in a reexamination of
all the previous decisions holding employees covered as "necessary" to
production to ascertain whether they are also "closely related" and
"directly essential" to production. That this may actually occur, how-
ever, is hardly likely. Indeed, the courts may well conclude that though
the revision of this area of the Act's coverage has resulted in some re-
striction and curtailment of its scope, many areas covered under the
original "necessary" clause remain unaffected by the new language.
This was plainly indicated by the explanations given during the debates
in the present Congress as to the effect of the new amendments. 23
An analysis of the legislative history of the amendments indicates
quite clearly that underlying the action taken by the Congress was the
concern of many of its members about the intrusion of Federal authority,
as a result of what they considered some extreme applications of the
so-called "necessary" clause, into the area of authority historically
reserved to the States.2 4  This concern is reflected in a statement con-
tained in the Statement of the Managers on the part of the House of
Representatives to the effect that the "production" coverage of the Act
under the so-called "necessary" clause has been interpreted "to cover
2 As noted in the Statement of a majority of the Senate Conferees:
"The language of the conference agreement should provide more certainty
in this field. It adopts the standard of closely related which the Supreme
Court has supplied in most of its decisions interpreting coverage." (95
Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949).
And, as pointed out by Congressman Lesinski, in explanation of the conference
agreement:
"The amended section gives the courts a more specific guide as to the in-
tention of Congress; it does not, however, radically revise the coverage
of the act as it has been interpreted by the courts in the past." (95 Cong.
Rec. 15135, Oct. 18, 1949).
2' The problem of construing the Act with regard "to the implications of our
dual system of government" (Kirschbaurn case, supra, at p. 520) has been one
about which the Supreme Court has been concerned virtually since the inception
of the Act in 1938. As Justice Frankfurter stated in the Kirschbaum decision:
"Perhaps in no domain of public law are general propositions less helpful
and indeed more mischievous than where boundaries must be drawn, under
a federal enactment, between what it has taken over for administration by
the central government and what it has left to the States. To a consider-
able extent the task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new
federal authority and historic functions of the individual States." (316
U.S. at p. 520).
That the problem was not merely of academic interest to the Court is demon-
strated by its subsequent decision in 10 East 40th St. Corp. v. Callus, 325 U.S.
578 (1945), in which the conclusion was reached that maintenance employees of
an office building housing a miscellany of business enterprises were not covered on
the ground that the operation of such a building was a "local business." (325 U.S.
at p. 583). The Court distinguished maintenance workers in such a building from
those working in a loft building in which actual manufacturing occurred.
[Vol. 28
1950] FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS 167
employees of many local merchants, because some of the customers of
such merchants are producing goods for interstate commerce." 25 And,
the Statement of a majority of the Senate conferees pointed out that
"The definition in the present Act [prior to the amendments] provides
no clear cut-off preventing extension of the coverage of the Act to
employees of an enterprise purely local in nature who may incidentally
perform some work having a remote or tenuous relationship to the
operations of a producer of goods for interstate commerce.
2 6
A further indication of the apprehension on the part of the House
Managers over the Act's extension to what they believed to be local
concerns is to be found in their listing of examples of cases in which
the Act will no longer be applicable under the revised definition of
"produced." Such cases include a local fertilizer company engaged in
selling all of its fertilizer to local farmers within the State, as in McComb,
Administrator v. Super-A Fertilizer Works;26a employees of a quarry
engaged in mining and processing stone for local use in the construction
of a dike located in the same State where such construction would have
the effect of preventing an oil field that produced oil for commerce from
being flooded, as in Schroeder v. Clifton;26' employees of a local window-
cleaning company doing business wholly within the State but many of
whose customers are engaged in interstate commerce or in the produc-
tions of goods for interstate commerce, as in Martino v. Michigan Win-
dow Cleaning Co.2
6c
It is perhaps in the light of this Congressional concern over the
broad application of the law in the areas referred to that an explana-
tion for the particular words chosen by the Congress to effect the re-
definition of "produced" is to be found.
In seeking terminology to define the coverage of the Act, the House
bill substituted the word "indispensable" for the word "necessary."
But apparently the substitution accomplished considerably more than
the Congress desired, in that to some members of the Congress, it ap-
peared to limit this area of coverage too severely. For example, the
word "indispensable" was referred to in the debates in the House as
"a remarkably restrictive word."27 Nevertheless, the bill as it initially
passed in the House contained that term. It seems fair to assume,
however, in view of the substitution of the words "directly essential"
in lieu of "indispensable" in the bill agreed to by the conferees that
they were opposed to the incorporation of so restrictive a term in the
-.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. p. 14.
"' 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949.20a 165 F. 2d 824 (1st Cir. 1948).
6b 153 F. 2d 385 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 858 (1946).
2-C 327 U.S. 173 (1946).
" 95 Cong. Rec. 11440, Aug. 10, 1949. See, also, 95 Cong. Rec. 15129, Oct. 18,
1949.
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new legislation. This view is supported by the Statement of a majority
of the Senate conferees that the reference in the language of the con-
ference agreement "to activities directly essential to production does
not, as did the House bill, require that the activities be indispensable to
production."28
Accordingly, though the Congress desired and sought language
which would both preclude the application of the Federal authority
over local business and curtail that authority in the several instances
in which the Congress believed it-had been unduly extended in the past,
apparently it was not intended that this was to be accomplished at the
expense of a severe restriction of the scope of the Act's coverage. The
desired language appears to have been found in the language of the
Kirschbaum decision. The Supreme Court in that case found that the
maintenance work described therein had a "close and immediate tie"
with the process of production for commerce and was an "essential part
of it."29 This sounds very similar to the "closely related" and "directly
essential" language which was finally incorporated into the Act. In
view of the Congress' obvious desire to uphold the validity of the
Kirschbaum decision, it seems reasonable to conclude that it considered
that decision as correctly defining the proper scope for the application
of the final clause of section 3(j). Its utilization of language so similar
to that used in the Kirschbaum case thus suggests the view that the
Congress believed that the language used in that decision represented
a spelling out of terms which, when expressed in legislative language,
would accomplish the confinement of the Federal authority to the area
it deemed desirable.
To aid in accomplishing this purpose, both branches of the legisla-
ture took pains to illuminate the signposts along the permitted path as
well as the warning signals surrounding the forbidden areas. As a
general proposition, the Congress appears to have adopted "the standard
of closely related which the Supreme Court has supplied in most of
its decisions interpreting coverage." 30  What type of case is beyond
the compass of that standard and within the forbidden areas, in the
judgment of the Congress, is illustrated by the cases specifically alluded
to as constituting an intrusion into the sphere of local business. 31 Simi-
larly, the type of case within that standard has been reasonably clearly
illustrated by the cases discussed below. Between these clearly defined
areas of non-coverage and coverage, as delineated by the Congress, lies
2' 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949.29316 U.S. at pp. 525, 526 (1942).
30 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949.
1 See McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, mepra; Schroeder v. Clifton,
supra; Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., supra.
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a twilight zone in which the greatest difficulty in ascertaining coverage
will be encountered.
3 2
As the Statement of the Managers on the part of the House poihted
out,3 3 "the proposed changes are not intended to remove from the act
maintenance, custodial, and clerical employees of manufacturers, min-
ing companies and other producers for commerce." Moreover, those
"employed by an independent employer performing such work on behalf
of the manufacturer, mining company, or other producer for commerce,"
are also entitled to the Act's protection. It is admittedly difficult to
reconcile this statement with the specific reference in the Statement to
employees of a local window-cleaning company, many of whose cus-
tomers are engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, as being beyond the pale of the Act.3 4 It may
be that an answer to this dilemma is not to be found so much in the
nature of the employment relation as in the degree of relationship to the
productive activities in that particular situation after considering all
the factors there involved, particularly what the Congress apparently
considered to be the strictly local nature of the business of this concern.
The Statement further notes that the new language "does not affect
the coverage under the Act of employees who repair or maintain build-
ings in which goods are produced for commerce (Kirschbaum v. Wall-
ing, 316 U.S. 517) or who make, repair, or maintain machinery or tools
and dies used in the production of goods for commerce . . . [or]
employees of public utilities, furnishing gas, electricity or water to firms
within the State engaged in manufacturing, producing, or mining goods
for commerce.... .,35
Similarly, the Statement of a majority of the Senate conferees, in
presenting a number of "illustrative" examples of employees who would
remain covered by the Act as engaged in activities "closely related" and
"directly essential" to production,3 6 includes "office or white-collar work-
ers,"37 "employees repairing, maintaining, improving or enlarging the
buildings, equipment, or facilities of producers of goods" for com-
"The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division is charged with the re-
sponsibility of initially determining coverage under the Act. Interpretative bulle-
tins are now being prepared which will contain statements of the Administrator's
position with respect to the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949. It is
expected that these bulletins will be issued prior to the effective date of the new
amendments, which is January 25, 1950. The interpretations contained in these
bulletins will form the basis upon which the Administrator will conduct his en-
forcement program.
" H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14.
" Id. at pp. 14, 15.
"Ibid.
"95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct. 19, 1949.
" Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945) ; Roland Electrical Co. v. Wall-
ing, 326 U.S. 657 (1946); Meeker Cooperative v. Phillips, 158 F. 2d 698 (8th
Cir. 1946); Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Hertz Drivurself
Stations v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th Cir. 1945).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
merce,38 "plant guards, watchmen, and other employees performing
protective or custodial services" for producers, 0 employees engaged in
the "production of tools, dies, designs, patterns, machinery, machinery
parts, mine props, industrial sand, or other equipment used by [the]
purchaser in producing goods for commerce, '40 employees engaged in
"producing and supplying fuel, power, water or other goods for cus-
tomers using such goods in the production of different goods for inter-
state commerce,"'4 1 and employees performing "industrial laundry work
for customers engaged in manufacturing, mining, or other production
of goods for interstate commerce."
'42
In these extensive citations of cases in both the Statement of the
Managers on the part of the House and the Statement of a majority of
the Senate conferees, the Congress appears to have been primarily con-
cerned with indicating the type of activities having a "close and im-
mediate tie"43 to the production of goods for commerce which it intends
the Federal Government to regulate under the provisions of the statute
-and, conversely, the absence of such regulation (because the activity
is likely to be a matter of local concern and jurisdiction) where the
relationship between production for commerce and the activity in ques-
tion is remote and tenuous.
II
From the foregoing, does it appear that any guides for the future
interpretation of the scope of the Act's coverage have been established?
Is it possible to draw any tentative conclusions?
Although the courts have consistently held, and the Congress has
not indicated an intention to overrule them in this respect, that the
activity in which an employee is engaged determines coverage under
the Act, nevertheless it seems likely that the courts may in the future
" Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946) ; Walling v. McCrady
Construction Co., 156 F. 2d 932 3rd Cir. 1946) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517 (1942); Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945); Walling v. Mid-Conti-
nent Pipe Line Co., 143 F. 2d 308 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d
11 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
"Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944) ; Wantock v. Ar-
mour & Co., 323 U.S. 126 (1944); Walling v. Sondock, 132 F. 2d 77 (5th Cir.
1942) ; Engebretsen v. Albrecht, 150 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Slover v. Wathen,
140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Shepler v. Crucible Steel Co., 140 F. 2d 371 (3rd
Cir. 1944) ; Walling v. Thompson, 65 F. Supp. 686 (D. Cal. 1946).
"' Holland v. Amoskeag Machine Co., 44 F. Supp. 884 (D. N.H. 1942) ; Tormey
v, Kiekhaefer Corp., 76 F. Supp. 557 (E. D. Wis. 1948) ; Walling v. Amidon, 153
F. 2d 159 (10th Cir. 1946); Walling v. Hamner, 64 F. Supp. 690 (W. D. Va.
1946); Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
4' Reynolds v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n., 143 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir.
1944) ; Phillips v. Meeker Coop. Light and Power Ass'n., 158 F. 2d 698 (8th Cir.
1946); Lewis v. Florida Power and Light Co., 154 F. 2d 751 (5th Cir. 1946);
West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling, 153 F. 2d 582 (6th Cir. 1946).
"' Koerner v. Ass'n. Linen Suppliers Laundry, 279 App. Div. 986, 62 N. Y. S.
2d 774 (1946).
"' 316 U.S. at p. 525 (1942).
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examine more closely into the nature of the business conducted by the
employer. However, this does not mean that coverage will be precluded
in all situations in which the employer is engaged in a business which
generally appears to be local in character. That the "local business"
factor alone is not intended to be controlling is made manifest by the
"illustrative" enumeration of employees who remain entitled to the
Act's benefits. For example, employees who "make, repair, or main-
tain machinery or tools and dies used in the production of goods for
commerce" and "employees of public utilities, furnishing gas, electricity,
or water to firms within the State engaged in manufacturing, produc-
ing, or mining goods for commerce," as well as many other similarly
situated, are, as demonstrated above, within the coverage of'the Act.44
Yet many of these employees are employed by firms which may be
regarded as having many aspects characteristic of local business. Never-
theless, in solving the problem of whether a process or occupation in
which an employee is engaged is "closely related" and "directly essen-
tial" to production for commerce, the closeness and essentiality of the
type of business in which he is employed to the production for commerce
that is within the ambit of the Act may become extremely significant
and at times even decisive.
45
Coupled with the factor of the employer's business, as a determinant,
is the relationship between the work actually performed by the employee
and the production for commerce subject to the Act. In the course of
discussion on the floor of the House, it was suggested that "Employees
engaged in activities which are several degrees or stages removed from
the production of goods for commerce cannot be said to be engaged in
a process or occupation closely related thereto."46  As an example of
employee activities which they had in mind, an illustration was there
presented of "employees of a dealer who sells sawmill equipment to a
producer of mine props, which are sold to a mine within the same State
producing coal for commerce." 41 But, as stated in the same discussion,
"On the other hand, the employees of the mine prop producer, in such
a situation, would be covered" and thus entitled to the protection of
the Act.48 There is, accordingly, support for the view that generally
activities several steps removed from the final production for commerce
may not be within the purview of the Act, as amended.
It is not likely that the greatest difficulty will be found in problems
involving activities which are an ascertainable number of stages re-
moved from production for commerce. Such problems lend themselves
"' H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14.
"Cf. Wantock v. Armour & Co., 323 U.S. 126 (1944) ; 10 East 40th Street
Corp. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
"95 Cong. Rec. 15135, Oct. 18, 1949.
17 Ibid. "8Ibid.
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more readily to mathematical solutions. But neither mathematics nor
logic will afford much comfort to one seeking to resolve the issue of
coverage in a type 'of case which falls somewhere between the window
washing involved in the Martino case and the maintenance activities
described in the Kirschbaum case. Difficult questions may also be pre-
sented in situations involving employees other than those employed by
the actual producer, as to whether their activities which in varying
degrees relate to the comfort, social needs or morale of the employees
actually engaged in production "directly aid production in a practical
sense by providing something essential to the carrying on, in an effective,
efficient, and satisfactory manner, of operations which are part of an
integrated effort for the production of goods." 49
To engage in more than "scientifically guessing" at this time would
be the height of folly. Coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 hds in some respects been curtailed by the new amendments.
Precisely to what extent and in what manner cannot be definitively
stated. In reply to those who request a precise solution to all of the
problems raised by these amendments, I can only point to the statement
of Justice Frankfurter in the Kirschbaum case in which he repeated as
to the Fair Labor Standards Act what Chief Justice Hughes had said
of the National Labor Relations Act:
"... the criterion is necessarily one of degree. . . . This does
not satisfy those who seek for mathematical or rigid formulas.
But such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the
Constitution such as 'interstate commerce,' 'due process,' 'equal
protection.' In maintaining the balance of the constitutional
grants and limitations, it is inevitable that we should define their
applications in the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion.
Santa. Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
303 U.S. 453, 467 (1938)."50
" Statement of a majority of the Senate conferees, 95 Cong. Rec. 15372, Oct.
19, 1949.- 316 U.S. 517, 526 (1942).
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